St. John's Law Review
Volume 45
Number 4 Volume 45, May 1971, Number 4

Article 11

The "Hot Issue": Possible Hidden Causes
Hugh L. Sowards
James S. Mofsky

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

THE "HOT ISSUE": POSSIBLE
HIDDEN CAUSES
HUGH L. SowARDS*
JAMES S. MOFSKY**

In 1968-1969 the securities industry and the investing public experienced a dramatic "hot issue" market. After a subsequent period of
depressed market conditions, "hot issues" are now beginning to reappear in increasing numbers.' The "hot issue" phenomenon occurs when
securities trade in the after-market at an immediate, and often substantial, premium over the public offering price. A corporation whose
securities are already traded publicly would generally offer additional
securities of the same kind or class at the existing market price at the
time of the offering. Accordingly, such a company would not usually
participate in a "hot issue" market. But there is no market price for the
shares of a closely-held corporation, and if such a firm were to contemplate a public financing, the public offering price per share of stock
would be determined through negotiations between the underwriter
and corporate officials. It is in connection with first public offerings of
this latter group of corporations that the "hot issue" phenomenon may
arise.
WHAT CAUSES A "HOT ISSUE"?

The explanations offered to date for this unique occurrence include analyses of the supply of and demand for the new issues.2 For
example, it has been suggested that a number of practices of underwriters and dealers artificially influence supply or demand and thus
result in after-market quotations which may, on the day the public
offering becomes effective, be one, two or three hundred percent
greater than the initial offering price. 3 When some such practices are
* Professor of Law, University of Miami, School of Law. B.S., Trinity College, 1941;
LL.B., Yale University, 1946.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami, School of Law. B.A., Wesleyan
University, 1956; LL.B., Cornell University, 1959; LL.M., University of Miami, 1966; SJ.D.,
The George Washington University, 1971.
i See Wall St. J., Feb. 26, 1971, at 1, col. 6.
2 See SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SiEcuRrrms MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th

Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 514 (1963) [hereinafter SEC SPECIAL STUDY]; Rotberg, The "Hot
Issues," 17 Bus. LAw. 360 (1962); Comment, SecuritiesRegulation: Legislative and Administrative Treatment of the "Hot Issue" Phenomenon, 1968 DUKE L.J. 1137.
3 Some of the practices suggested include (a) distribution of the securities only to
purchasers who plan to retain their holdings for a substantial period of time, the underwriter sometimes enforcing such long-term retention by refusing to allot future "hot
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affected with an intent to limit supply or increase demand as opposed
to facilitating an orderly distribution, such activities amount to manipulation. 4 Other practices may amount to unlawful manipulation without the necessity of showing an intent to artificially limit supply or
increase demand. 5
But it is difficult to believe that a large percentage of the recent
"hot issues" has resulted from manipulation. The Securities and Exchange Commission has sufficient statutory authority to adopt new
rules or enforce existing ones to deal with such practices, 6 and yet the
Commission has done little in this connection. 7 If a primary cause of
"hot issues" has indeed been the manipulative techniques of underwriters and dealers, the inactivity of the Commission is especially surprising in view of the recommendations of the Special Study of the
Securities Markets, published in 1963, six years before the end of the
last "hot issue" market.8 Perhaps, the members and staff of the Commission do not believe that manipulation is such a significant factor. In
any event, there have been no empirical studies supporting the manipulation theory.
Some of the explanations contain statements about the phenomenon which are undoubtedly true. By way of illustration, it is undeniable
issues" to purchasers who immediately resell and by penalizing registered representatives
whose customers immediately resell; (b) allocation of the securities to discretionary accounts
managed by the underwriter so that the time of resale is within the control of the underwriter; (c) late notification to purchasers of their allotments; (d) refusal to effect sell
orders; (e) late delivery of stock certificates; (f) allocation of a portion of the "hot issue" to
officers, partners and employees of the underwriting firm or members of the underwriting
syndicate or to relatives of such persons; (g) recommendations of "hot issues" for customers
whose accounts are too conservative to justify purchase of such securities; (h) untrue
statements concerning the company's financial condition, dividend prospects, the plan of
distribution, or other matters involving the market conditions relating to the security; (i)
creation of a false appearance of an independent market; (0) creation of an artificial
appearance of trading activity; (k) execution of sham transactions; or (1)unfair withholding
or free-riding in contravention of the rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD). For discussion of these and other practices, see the materials cited in note 2 supra.
4 See Comment, supra note 2, at 1146.
5See id. at 1148-58.
6See the materials cited in note 2 supra for a collection of the applicable federal
statutes and rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
7

In1946 the SEC proposed a rule which would have made it a fraudulent practice to
offer an undistributed portion of an issue at a price greater than the initial public offering
price, unless for a reasonable time period a bona fide offer had been made to distribute
the securities at the initial public offering price. See Proposed Rule X-15C2-3, (April 16,
1946). This proposed rule was never adopted.
8 The Special Study made extensive recommendations in connection with the "hot
issue" phenomenon. See SEC SPEciAL Stuny, pt. 1, at 557-59. Such recommendations have
not resulted in new Commission rules, except that the Commission has announced a policy
that it will deny acceleration of effectiveness of certain registration statements unless the
prospectus in substantially final form is delivered to prospective purchasers at least fortyeight hours prior to sale. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4968 (Apr. 24, 1969).
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that the phenomenon generally applies to close corporations whose
public offerings coincide with periods when investors' optimism is
sufficiently great to generate heated speculative activity in the securities
markets. 9 It is also true that such speculation and optimism contribute
to a greater demand for the limited number of shares sold publicly than
would exist during a less speculative period. 1
But these statements merely describe the symptoms of the phenomenon. They do not provide an answer for the most significant question:
why, during a period of speculative market activity, would controlling
shareholders of the close corporation agree to an initial public offering
price substantially below prices which would prevail in the immediate
after-market? Superficially, such arrangements would appear contrary
to the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders, because less
than maximum amounts would be generated from the public offering.
Yet such agreements must be made regularly; otherwise, the "hot issue"
phenomenon would not exist, unless the phenomenon were explained
on the basis that controlling shareholders of closely-held corporations
often mistakenly judged after-market prices. But experience indicates
that controlling shareholders have substantial information regarding
the pricing of first public issues and after-market quotations. Thus, the
answer to the above question must be based on some conscious motive
of controlling shareholders and underwriters. The behavior of underwriters and controlling shareholders in this connection might best be
considered through the use of a hypothetical situation. Such a model is
presented below in the form of a highly simplified problem.
A corporation was organized several years ago as a closely-held firm.
For the usual reasons, its controlling shareholders have decided to pursue a public offering of its common stock. For purposes of simplicity,
assume that the corporation will have twenty shares of common stock
outstanding (of course there would be many times that number of
shares outstanding in an actual public offering) upon conclusion of the
public offering and that the underwriters and promoters agree that the
promoters should retain a 50 percent interest in the firm. Thus, the promoters will hold an aggregate of ten shares subsequent to the completion of the offering. These ten shares (or the shares representing them
before the usual split) were probably issued during the past several
years for promotional activities, services, property, cash, and intangibles
9 See SEC

SPECIL STMUY, pt. 1, at 514-59; STATE OF WiSCONSIN CoaVSSIONTE OF
Sept. 1967, at 1. Interview with Manuel F. Cohen, FORBES, Feb.
15, 1968, at 43; Israels, Throop, Cohen, Loomis, Kennedy & Blackstone, Panel Discussion:
Offerings of New Securities, 18 Bus. LAw. 37 (1962).
10 See Comment, supra note 2, at 1138-41.
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such as ideas and patents. If the net worth of the firm before the public
offering is $500 and the public investors pay $150 per share (a figure
determined by negotiation between the underwriters and promoters)
for their ten shares, the net worth of the firm after the offering will be
$2,000 and the book value per share will be $100 ($2,000 + 20 shares).
Again to simplify the model, expenses of the offering such as underwriters' discounts and commissions are not taken into account.
Assume further that, immediately after the public offering and
before there is any significant change in the company's financial conditions or earnings, the common shares are trading heavily in the overthe-counter market at $300 per share (100 percent more than the public
offering price). If the firm had offered its stock at its after-market price
of $300 per share, its aggregate net worth would have been $3500 rather
than $2000 and the book value per share would have been $175 instead
of $100. Thus, by virtue of offering its shares at $150 per share rather
than at $300, the firm has sustained a total book value loss of $1500 and
a net worth loss per share of $75. This example is not exaggerated when
compared to some of the "hot issues" which appeared during 1961 and
1969." z
The previously posed question may now be asked in more concrete
terms: if the corporation and indirectly, the promoters are damaged to
the extent of 50 percent of the company's book value, why would the
underwriters and promoters negotiate the $150 per share public offering
price? Underwriters profit in two respects from this kind of pricing.
First of all, such a "hot issue" often generates a significant amount of
after-market trading. Since the underwriter generally makes the initial
market after the offering, he will earn substantial dealer mark-ups and
broker commissions, sometimes amounting to as much as the total
underwriting discount. Second, the publicity of this successful "hot
issue" may attract syndicate members and retail customers for the
underwriter's next offering.
With respect to the motivation of the promoters or controlling
shareholders, they may be willing to accept the loss to the corporation
if the underwriter can provide them with a method of recouping their
individual indirect loss on the book value of their shares. It is submitted
that an often used method to accomplish this objective is the allocation
to controlling shareholders of shares of "hot issue" stock in other offerings by the same underwriter, in sufficient quantities so that the profits
from the sale of such stock approximate the book value loss on the
shares of controlling persons. However, this conclusion will be appli11 See, e.g., Rotberg, supra note 2, at 360.
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cable only if the controlling shareholders elect, or are forced, to retain
their shares rather than to sell them at the maximum public offering
price which would be supported by the market (in this case, a price in
excess of $150 per share and possibly as much as $300).
If such persons sell their shares at $300 per share, then of course,
they would be maximizing their interests without harm to the corporation, and there would be no reason for them to engage in the previously
described trade-off with underwriters. But, as will be seen below, there
are state securities laws and regulations and a rule of the National
Association of Securities Dealers, 12 sanctioned by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 13 which frequently have the effect of precluding
controlling persons and promoters from selling their shares publicly at
the time of their company's initial public offering. These laws and
rules may have significantly contributed to the large number of "hot
issues" which have occurred during speculative periods in the securities
markets.
BLUE SKY LAws AND

NASD

CONSIDERATIONS

With respect to the Blue Sky laws, absent some exemption, the
shares of a controlling person or promoter which are offered for sale in a
public offering must be registered prior to sale. In connection with a
registration, state administrators may order under certain circumstances
that such shares be escrowed pursuant to state statutes or rules, and
thus such shares may not be freely transferable even if registered under
the Securities Act of 1933. If the controlling person's shares qualify
under the Blue Sky definition of promotional shares, 14 the statutes or
rules in forty states require escrow of such shares before the state
administrators may permit the company's issue to qualify for public
sale in their respective states. 15 Of these states, nineteen do not permit
12 See "Rules of Fair Practice" article III, § 1, NASD MANUAL D-5-D-27 (1967).
13 With respect to the registration of a national securities association under section
15A of the Exchange Act, the Commission is authorized
to abrogate any rule of a registered securities association, if after appropriate notice
and opportunity for hearing, it appears to the Commission that such abrogation is
necessary or appropriate to assure fair dealing by the members of such association,
to assure a fair representation of its members in the administration of its affairs
or otherwise to protect investors or effectuate the purposes of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1964).
14 See note 18 infra for a definition of promotional securities.
4
35 ALA. CODE tit. 53, § 34(b) (Supp. 1967); ALASKA STAT. § 5.55.110(g) (Supp. 1966);
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1876 (1967); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1245(g) (1966); CAL. CORPS.
CODE § 25141 (West Supp. 1969); COLO. R.v. STAT. ANN. § 125-1-10(7) (1963); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 517.18 (1962); GA. CODE ANN. § 97-104.1(C) (1968); HAWAI REV. LAws § 199-14 (Supp.
1965); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1428 (1967); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211, § 137.11(E) (Supp. 1970);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-8600) (Supp. 1969); IOWA CODE § 502.20 (1966); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-1259(d) (Supp. 1969); Ky. REv. STAT. § 292.380 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. § 51:713 (1965);
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release from escrow until dividends aggregating 5 to 6 percent have
been earned and paid on the public investors' shares. 16 The remaining jurisdictions allow release at the discretion of the regulators or after
7
a prescribed period..
Because of the broad definitions adopted by many states for the
term promotional securities, 8 many or all of the promoter's or controlling person's shares will be subject to the escrow restrictions. Thus,
the laws of most states may force such persons to be locked in and
unable to profit on their shares even if they were willing to have their
shares registered for immediate public sale. Consequently, promotors
affected by these escrow arrangements may be willing to negotiate a less
than maximum public offering price if they can be compensated immediately for their proportionate loss in their firm's net worth.
To circumvent the escrow problem, promoters and controlling persons might consider an offering only in those states where there is no
escrow requirement. It may, however, be impossible to successfully sell
the entire issue in those states. But even if the underwriting could be so
accomplished, there are legal and practical reasons why investment
bankers do not underwrite first public issues when the controlling
group sells a substantial percentage of its holdings.
Generally speaking, the cream of the underwriting business lies in
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.776(505)(f) (Supp. 1969); Miss. CODE ANN. § 5-364 (Supp. 1968); Mo.
REv. STAT. § 409.305() (Supp. 1969); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 15-2011 (1967); NR. REv.
STAT. § 8-1108(2) (Supp. 1965); NJ. REv. STAT. § 49:3-61 (Supp. 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 48-18-19(c) (1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78-11(1) (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-08.1(1)
(Supp. 1969); Osno REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.09(K) (Page 1964); OMAu.STAT. tit. 71, § 305(g)
(Supp. 1969); ORE. REv. STAT. § 59.085(3) (1967); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-165 (1962); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 48-1650 (1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-23 (1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§ 4223 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-510(h) (Supp. 1968); WASH. REv. CODE § 21.20.250 (1961);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3273(16) (1966); Wis. STAT. Ahr. § 551.27(7) (1969); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
17-117.11(g) (1965); Minn. Admin. Rules & Regs., S. Div. 43 (2 BLuE SKY L. REP.
26,604
(Aug. 12, 1966)); S.C. Regs. Comm'r. Sec., pt. 11G (3 BLUE SKY L. REP.
44,609 (Nov. 15,
1967)). Tex. Sec. Bd. Admin. Interp. (3 BLUE SKY L. REP.
46,634 (1970)).
16 Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Vermont, Virginia,
West Virginia. For citations see note 15 supra.
17 Alaska, Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming. For citations see note 15 supra.
18 An example of such broad definition is the one adopted by Division of Securities,
Department of Law, State of Colorado:
PROMOTIONAL SECURITIES (CHEAP STOCK):
Where an issuer is in the promotional, exploratory, or development stage, securities
which have been issued within three years of the date of filing, or are to be
issued to underwriters, promoters or insiders for an amount less than the public
offering price, or for a consideration other than cash (unless the value of such
consideration can be conclusively established) wil be subject to the following
conditions and restrictions.
Rules and Regs. Colo. Div. Sec., Rule V (1 BLUE SKY L. REP.
9706 (Jan. 1, 1967)).
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the profits which may arise in connection with warrants and bargain
stock allocated to investment bankers in connection with a public offering. Such warrants and the stock underlying them are usually purchased for investment purposes, and these securities may not be sold
publicly until a post-effective amendment to the registration statement
has been declared effective in connection with the warrants. x9 In short,
such warrants are restricted until they are registered under the 1933
Act and the appropriate state securities laws.20
However, underwriters will not wish to register their warrants for
sale at the time of the company's initial public offering because of the
six months holding period requirement under the provisions of the
tax laws. But even if underwriters were willing to forego capital gains
treatment of their profits on warrants, an NASD rule precludes its members (and most underwriters belong to the NASD 21) from transferring
underwriters' warrants for at least twelve months from the date of
receipt. 22 Similar registration and tax considerations apply to cheap
stock which may be purchased by investment bankers in lieu of warrants.
Underwriters will not want promoters and controlling shareholders
to be able to sell their stock until the underwriters' warrants are free
from NASD transfer restrictions. This desire is based on the belief that
a promoter or controlling stockholder who is locked into a large proportion of his shares will use greater efforts than other corporate executives
not so locked-in to manage the corporation's business in such a way as
to maximize the market price per share of the company's stock. In other
words, the amount of work expended by promoters and controlling
persons to increase the value of a company's shares will depend to a
large degree on the size of their share ownership which they will be
motivated to protect. Consequently, as long as underwriters hold restricted warrants or cheap stock, they will have an economic interest in
preventing promoters and controlling persons from disposing of a
significant amount of their shares at the time of the company's first
public offering.
To protect their interests and to avoid participation in a bail-out,
investment bankers may thus refuse to underwrite the issue if significant
amounts of promoters' or controlling persons' holdings are sold in
19 See Guides for Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements, No. 10, SEC
Securities Act Release No. 4936 (Dec. 9, 1968).
20 However, the rules of some blue sky commissioners restrict the transfer of such
warrants indefinitely and preclude their exercise for the first eleven months after issuance.
See, e.g., Rules Fla. Sec. Comm'n, 330-1.06 (1 BLOuE SKY L. REP.
13,606 (1968)).
21 For the reasons most underwriters belong to the NASD, see Sowards &C
Mofsky, The
Securities Industry: Regulatory Control Over Entry, 8 CORP. PRAC. CoNLv. 99,101 (1966).
22 See NASD Rules, supra note 12.
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connection with the company's first public issue. Again, in the event
such holdings are retained, promoters and controlling shareholders may
be willing to agree to a public offering price below the after-market
trading price, if they can be compensated for their book value loss in
the company's shares. As previously suggested, allocation to them of
"hot issue" stock in other companies can be a most satisfactory method
for accomplishing this objective.
The controlling person in "hot issue" Company A will not be a
control person in "hot issue" Company B by virtue of being allocated
23
a relatively small percentage of the outstanding stock of Company B.
Therefore, the controlling person need not be concerned about registration of his shares of Company B under the 1933 Act. Furthermore, his
shares in Company B will not be escrowed under Blue Sky laws, and
the underwriter will have no reason to want him locked into his Company B shares. Thus, this technique is an efficient one for compensating
the controlling shareholder personally and for obtaining agreement
on a public offering price below the immediate after-market valuation.
The amount of "hot issue" stock in unaffiliated companies allocated to controlling persons should depend to some extent on their
proportionate loss in the book value of their firms' stock. For example,
in the fact pattern stated above, the public offering price of $150 rather
than $300 per share would result in a book value loss of $75 per share to
the control person and the members of his group. On the basis of ten
shares, the total book value loss to these persons would be $750. Presumably, the underwriter will allocate to this group sufficient "hot
issue" stock which would generate, after taxes, an amount approximating $750.
CONCLUSiON

While the authors have observed the distribution of "hot issue"
stock in the manner described above, there have been no empirical
studies substantiating this theory. However, it has been a common
experience for investors to find it extremely difficult to obtain "hot
issue" stock at the public offering price. Even retail customers who are
regular and substantial traders have found that their brokers may
allocate to them perhaps only twenty-five shares of a "hot issue." It is
submitted that a substantial portion of the shares of "hot issue" companies may be channeled to controlling persons in firms which are
themselves having public offerings.
In sum, Blue Sky escrow requirements and the NASD rule restrict23 With respect to the problem of when a shareholder becomes a control person, see
Sommer, Who's "In Control"?-S.E.C., 21 Bus. LAw. 559 (1966).
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ing transfer of warrants may be significant causes of the "hot issue"
phenomenon. Of course, promoters and controlling persons may elect
not to sell their shares for some reason other than the Blue Sky escrow
and NASD restrictions, and they may nevertheless engage in the "hot
issue" trade-off described above. But this matter has not been studied
empirically and the degree to which the securities laws and NASD
rules have contributed to the "hot issue" problem is not known. It is a
problem in the context of the model set forth in this article, because in
this hypothetical situation, the only losers are the minority stockholders
who purchased shares in the after-market at prices in excess of the
public offering price. If the escrow regulations and NASD rule are
having the effect indicated, it is submitted that reform in this area is
needed. Although revision of the Blue Sky laws on a state-by-state basis
would be a most difficult undertaking, the Securities and Exchange
Commission -

which has approved the NASD rules -

authority to abrogate them.

has statutory

